Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, CAS
Colloquia & Seminars

Speaker:	宋阳波，香港中文大学深圳
Inviter:
Title:	Network-Based Peer Monitoring Design
Language:	Chinese
Time & Venue:	2024.03.06 10:00-11:00 思源楼315
Abstract:	We study a team incentive design problem where multiple agents are located on a network and work on a joint project. The principal seeks the least costly mechanism to incentivize full efforts, by choosing the work assignment sequence and the rewards to the agents upon success. Whereas the agents’ actions are hidden to the principal, they may be observed among the agents given the internal information that is determined by the network and the sequence. Under effort complementarity, the transparency of the agents’ actions can reduce their incentive costs but with decreasing marginal effectiveness. For several typical network topologies, we derive explicit properties of an optimal assignment sequence, and propose a number of measures to rank networks in terms of total cost and stability.